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Abstract 
 Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) are publicly funded organisations 
that provide small loans to people in financially underserved areas of the UK. Policy makers 
have repeatedly sought to understand and measure the performance of CDFIs to ensure 
the efficient use of public funds, but have struggled to identify an appropriate way of doing 
so. In this article, we empirically derive a framework which measures the performance of 
CDFIs through an analysis of their stakeholder relationships. Based on qualitative data 
from 20 English CDFIs, we develop a typology of CDFIs according to three dimensions: 
organisational structure, type of lending, and type of market served. Following on from this, 
we derive several propositions that consider how these dimensions relate to the financial 
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1. Introduction 
Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) are regarded as a key policy tool 
for community regeneration and development in the UK (Policy Action Team 3, 1999; 
Social Investment Task Force, 2000; Bank of England, 2000). By providing credit and 
related services to individuals and enterprises in deprived communities, they tap a 
market that has largely been ignored by mainstream financial institutions. CDFIs are 
often seen as the developed world counterparts of microfinance institutons (MFIs) that 
operate in developing countries, and a key point of discussion has been whether it is 
appropriate to use the same kinds of measures and techniques in both contexts. I  
addition to the fact that CDFIs’ activities extend beyond microfinance, we believe that 
the differences between microfinance in developing and developed countries are very 
significant, and that there is a need for a performance measurement framework that is 
specific to developed economies. Our aim in this article is to examine the factors that 
underpin CDFI performance in the UK, taking into account both social and financial 
performance. For this purpose we use stakeholder theory, and link the question of 
performance measurement to the stakeholder environment of CDFIs. 
  
To date, the CDFI movement has been considered as a rather homogeneous tity by 
UK policy makers. Beginning in 1997, significant funds were directed towards the 
sector to promote community development (e.g. via the so-called Phoenix Fu d). This 
mirrored an earlier initiative in the US in 1994, when the Clinton administration 
established a well-endowed CDFI fund to promote the regeneration of communities 
with low levels of economic activity and high levels of unemployment (Benjamin et al., 
2004). Since the late 1990s the CDFI sector has grown rapidly in theUK, with almost 
                                                
* The authors thank Alexander Kritikos and Belinda Bell for very helpful comments. Kneiding gratefully 
acknowledges the financial support of the EQUAL-framework ‘EXZEPT’ which is financed by the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
1 GfA - Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmarktaktivierung, Kufsteinerstr. 7, 10825 Berlin, Germany, Tel.: 0044-
7942-058 288, Email: kneiding@gfa-kritikos.de 
2  Judge Business School, The University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK, Email: 
p.tracey@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
 2 
half of the 80 CDFIs currently operating established since 2004 (CDFA, 2006). 
Evaluations of their operations have generally painted a positive picture of th  sector, 
but the validity and reliability of these studies have been questioned (NEF, 2001; NEF, 
2006; CDFA, 2006). Insufficient data availability and varying data quality, which are 
partly a function of the relative newness of the sector, have posed particular problems. 
More fundamentally, two closely connected issues remain unsolved: (1) current ways of 
measuring CDFI performance are not guided by a coherent theoretical rationale; (2) 
public bodies therefore have no proper guidelines to direct further funds into the sector. 
Based on a qualitative research design, our paper uses a novel approach to address these 
issues. 
We argue that there is no single set of performance measures which can be applied to 
the sector as a whole. Instead, we develop a performance measurement fra ework that 
can be used as a tool to monitor the individual stakeholder relationships of each CDFI. 
Based on their stakeholder environments, we identify different types of CDFIs 
according to three dimensions: organisational structure, type of lending (regarding loan 
size and target group served), and whether the CDFI’s primary focus is the client or the 
funder market. We argue that it is essential to consider these dimnsions and to 
qualitatively describe the nature of the relationships that CDFIs have with their 
stakeholders when establishing a performance measurement framework. In the 
discussion section, we derive several propositions to illustrate how these factors might 
affect the financial and social performance of CDFIs. 
 
Thus, the aim of this paper is not to define a set of performance measures for the CDFI 
sector, but to lay the foundation for a new way of thinking about CDFI performance. 
Although the study only pertains to the UK, there are strong grounds for supposing that 
our framework may have relevance for community finance in other developed 
countries. First, the CDFI sector in the UK is quite mature compared to other 
industrialized countries. Second, the financial resources that have been channelled 
through the Phoenix Fund, and which are unparalleled in the European context, have 
forced CDFIs to consider carefully how they should account for theirfinancial and 
social performance. Third, the CDFI sector in the UK is often regarded as a role model 
for other European countries and may therefore offer valuable insights that facilitate the 
development of community finance elsewhere. 
 
 3 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we relate stakeholder theory to 
performance measurement and outline a framework that conceptualizes this link. In the 
third section we detail our methods, and describe how the data were collected and 
analysed. Following an account of the results of our interviews in the fourth section, we 
develop a preliminary framework for the measurement of CDFI performance that 
incorporates both the social and financial aspects of performance. Fi ally, we consider 
the implications of our study for practitioners, policy makers and cademics, and 
suggest directions for future research. 
 
 
2. Stakeholder Theory and Performance Measurement in the Context of CDFIs 
2.1. Main Theories 
At the time when Eccles (1991) proclaimed a ‘performance measurement revolution’ 
and questioned the hegemony of financial data in corporate accounting system , most 
firms remained firmly reliant upon a single set of financial measures to gauge their 
performance. The situation has changed substantially since then, with many firms and 
other organisations seeking to account for non-financial dimensions of perfrmance in 
addition to financial ones (Neely, 1999). At the same time, a significa t body of 
scholarship, much of it rooted in stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), has proposed 
ways of including non-financial measures into analyses of corporate performance. Most 
notably, Clarkson (1995) advocated that corporate social performance could be analysd 
and evaluated more effectively by using a framework based on the management of a 
corporation’s relationships with its stakeholders. This led him to define the corporation 
as a system comprising primary stakeholder groups, these being defi ed as ‘persons or 
groups that have, or claim, ownerships, rights, or interests in a corporation and its 
activities, past, present, or future’ (Clarkson, 1995: 106). Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
helped to structure the early discussions about the nature of stakeholder relationships by 
introducing a taxonomy of normative, instrumental, and descriptive stakeholder types. 
 
Building on this work, Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997) extended the performance 
measurement discussion from a managerial point of view, noting that the systems used 
by most firms to measure non-financial performance are essentially extensions of their 
financial reporting systems. While this may or may not be appropriate for corporations, 
for other organisational forms, most notably non-profit organisations that are 
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characterised by their double (financial and social) or even triple (financial, social and 
environmental) bottom lines, this approach to performance measurement is generally 
deemed insufficient (Pearce, 2003). In order to capture the multidimensional nature of 
performance, Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997) focus their definition of performance on 
‘one output of strategic planning: senior management’s choice of the nature and scope 
of the contracts that it negotiates, both explicitly and implicitly, with its stakeholders’ 
(1997: 26). The performance measurement system, in turn, is the tool the organisation 
uses to monitor these contractual relationships. Within their study, the authors only 
consider for-profit organisations, but they point out that this does not limit the 
applicability of their work to organisations with multiple objectives. They distinguish 
between environmental stakeholders that define the critical elements of a company’s 
competitive strategy, and process stakeholders that work within the environment 
defined by the external stakeholders.  
 
When applying this system of performance measurement, one needs to understand the 
importance that is attributed to the individual stakeholders by a given management 
team, and to ‘get inside the heads’ of managers (Jones et al., 2007). With respect to this 
question of ‘who or what really counts’ to organisations, Mitchell et al. (1997) provided 
much needed clarity through their theory of stakeholder identification nd salience. In 
this typology the three principal determinants of salience – power (th  ability of the 
stakeholder group to bring about outcomes that it desires, despite resis ance), legitimacy 
(the extent to which the stakeholder group’s relationship with the organisation is 
socially accepted and expected), and urgency (the degree to which the stakeholder 
group’s claim is time sensitive and of critical importance to the organisation) – combine 
linearly to produce seven different types of stakeholder groups, each with a predicted 
level of salience for managers of the organisation in question. In the paper we combine 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) typology with insights from Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997) in 
order to develop a performance measurement framework designed to examin  these 
stakeholder relationships in the context of CDFIs. 
 
2.2. Community Development Finance in the UK 
In the UK, CDFIs have emerged in the past ten years to address financial exclusion and 
problems with access to finance for enterprises (NEF, 2006). During th s time policy 
support for the sector resulted in significant public funding to enterpris -lending CDFIs 
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through (a) the Phoenix Fund, a development fund to promote innovative ways of 
supporting enterprise in deprived areas; (b) the establishment of the Community 
Development Finance Association (CDFA), the trade association of CDFIs; and (c) the 
Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR), a scheme that encourages investment in 
disadvantaged communities by giving tax relief to investors who back usinesses and 
other enterprises in less advantaged areas by investing in accredited CDFIs. According 
to the CDFA, by 2005, CDFIs had financed over 18,000 businesses and people; they 
claim to have created 11,000 jobs and sustained another 88,000, while the finance 
provided has helped to lever £285 million of funds from other sources (CDFA, 2005).  
 
The structure of CDFIs in developed countries is far from homogenous. F r example, in 
the US, in contrast to the UK, CDFIs have been able to attract large funds from 
religious institutions and private individuals (Pinsky, 2001). There is also disagreement 
within and between countries about their role and effectiveness in facilitating 
community development (Affleck and Mellor, 2006). However, there is general 
agreement that CDFIs are independent financial institutions that provide capital and 
support to enable individuals or organisations to develop and create wealth in 
disadvantaged communities and/or under-served markets (Derban et al., 2005). The 
financial products and services that CDFIs provide are not usually available from 
mainstream lenders and financiers. Many CDFIs augment their loans with a range of 
counselling and educational services that increase their borrowers’ economic capacities 
and potential (Benjamin et al., 2004).  
 
A key feature of CDFIs is the so-called double bottom line, i.e. their aim to achieve 
financial and social returns on investment (Derban et al., 2005). However, this concept 
is not unproblematic. Two issues have been particularly contested. First, with respect to 
financial returns, should performance measurement focus on the extent to which a given 
CDFI is financially sustainable (i.e., generates enough revenue from interest payments 
to cover its operating costs and grow its loan programme), or should performance be 
measured by the extent to which it is successful in attracting external funding from 
government, foundations, and other sources? Second, with respect to social returns, 
what is social performance (Clarkson, 1995), and how can social returns be measured in 
a valid and reliable way (Sinha, 2006; Tulchin, 2003)? The issue of social performance 
is particularly complex because (1) some kinds of social outcome, e.g., improveents to 
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an individual’s quality of life or a community’s standard of living, are not easily 
amenable to quantification, and (2) CDFIs operate in a diverse rang  of communities, 
and the kinds of social issues that they seek to address therefore often differ 
substantially (Woller, 2006).  
 
More generally, little is known about the interaction between the factors that underpin 
financial and social measures of performance.3 In order to establish a performance 
measurement framework for CDFIs it is necessary to describe thes  interactions. Only 
then, we suggest, will it be possible to determine if the performance of all CDFIs should 
be measured according to the same criteria, or if the measures used should be conting nt 
upon the nature of a given CDFI and the market in which it operates. In line with the 
arguments of Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997), in this article we identify the criteria for 
measuring performance by analysing the ways in which CDFIs interact with their 
stakeholders. Subsequently, we establish propositions that seek to explain how these 
interactions affect the financial and social dimensions of CDFI performance. This is 
especially important because, as with non-profit organisations more bradly, there is 
little scholarship that considers how performance measurement migh be theorized. This 
article therefore has the following research objectives:  
(1) To develop a typology for classifying different types of CDFIs;  
(2) to develop a preliminary framework for gauging CDFI performance that 
incorporates both social and financial measures and that is able to account 
for the diversity within the CDFI movement.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data Collection 
Data on 20 English CDFIs were collected in spring 2007 via semi-structured interviews 
(see Table 1 in the Appendix). Credit unions and bigger national organisatio s such as 
Charity Bank or Triodos Bank were not included in the sample, as the legal structure of 
a banking institution, staff size, as well as their turnover volume does n t allow for a 
meaningful comparison against the majority of CDFIs that adopt the legal structures of 
                                                
3 The only empirical approach towards measuring the performance of CDFIs in the UK focussed on their 
loan repayment rates, implicitly assuming this to be a ‘good’ performance measure (Derban et al., 
2005). While we appreciate the importance of this measure, we do think it might yield a slanted view of 
factors influencing performance and accordingly distort the empirical results towards a purely financil 
interpretation of performance.  
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Industrial and Provident Societies (IPS), Charities or Limited Companies, and that are 
staffed with a very small team of employees. 
 
Interviews were conducted with the loan fund manager of each CDFI, who in some 
cases was also the CEO of the institution. The average interview lasted slightly more 
than one hour and consisted of two parts. Initially, a topic guide was used to acquire 
information about the history of the institution as well as its stakeholders. Prepared 
index cards were shown to the interviewee to represent the CDFI’s stakeholders; where 
necessary these were adjusted to the specific context of the institut on during the course 
of the interview. At the end of the first part of the interview, these records were 
presented to the respondent to verify the set of stakeholders for the institution.  
 
The second part of the interview aimed to identify the underlying construct  used by the 
interviewee in order to ascribe meaning to each stakeholder. This was done by utilizing 
the repertory grid technique, which is based on George Kelly’s per onal constructs 
theory (Kelly, 1955). The technique has its origin in clinical cognitive psychology, but 
has also been applied by a number of economists (e.g., Reger and Palmer, 1996; Hisrich 
and Jankowicz, 1990). The interviewee is asked to compare three elements (in our case 
three of the institution’s stakeholders), and specify how any two of these stakeholders 
are alike and thereby different from the third.4 In this way, bipolar dimensions used by 
the respondent to differentiate among the particular stakeholders were elicited. Thus, 
researcher-imposed structure on subject-cognition was minimized. This procedure 
continued until it became obvious that no other constructs could be elicited from the 
interviewee. Finally, three constructs were supplied by the interviewer, which were 
based on the salience dimensions defined by Mitchell et al. (1997):  
• The stakeholder’s claims are powerful vs. the stakeholder’s claims re not 
powerful (dimension of power) 
• The stakeholder’s claims are legitimate vs. the stakeholder’s claims are 
illegitimate (dimension of legitimacy) 
• The stakeholder’s claims are urgent vs. the stakeholder’s claims are not urgent 
(dimension of urgency) 
 
                                                
4 This is referred to the “minimum context form” of construct elicitation as opposed to the “full context 
form” in which the interviewee is asked to select similar pairs out of the whole set of elements 
(Fransella and Bannister, 1977, p. 14-15). 
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Informants were then asked to rate all stakeholders on a five-point-scale based on the 
dimensions they named, with the extreme of the scales being represented by the 
opposite constructs. For example, ‘1’ indicated best match for the emerg nt pole, and 
‘5’ for the opposite pole. If none of the construct’s poles are predominant, ‘3’ is used 
(see Figure 1 in the Appendix for an example of a completed grid). In two cases where a 
loan fund had ceased to operate, we stopped at the second step of the analysis, focused 
on the reasons for the closure and how they were connected to the stakeholder 
environment of the institution. 
 
3.2. Data Analysis 
The interviews were tape-recorded, and a detailed transcription was compiled for each 
participating institution. The average length of the typescript was 20 pages. Digital 
recordings of the interviews were retained for consultation as required. Additionally, the 
repertory grids that were defined during the course of the interviews were compiled by 
the interviewer on the basis of the tape recordings and then reverted to the interviewee 
for completion. The interviewees were sent the repertory grid within two working days 
so that the discussion was fresh in his/her mind. Eighteen completed rep rtory grids 
were received in total (as detailed in Section 3.1., two repertory grids were not compiled 
as in these cases the loan funds had ceased to operate). 
 
 
Figure 2: Fully Specified CDFI Stakeholder Map. 
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we adopted Atkinson and Waterhouse’s (1997) 
definition of performance measurement as a tool to monitor stakeholder re ationships. 
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Based on a review of existing typologies of organisational stakeholders (cf. Sirgy, 2002) 
we identified in a first step a total of eight distinct stakeholders (see Figure 2). 
According to the typology of Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997), stakeholders can be 
broken down into process stakeholders (employees, board, and cooperating partners), 
and environmental stakeholders (policy makers, clients, local community, funders, and 
private investors). There is a clear separation between the source of funds (policy 
makers, funders, and private investors), and the use of funds (clients, and local 
community) for environmental stakeholders. In the following part of this section, we 
briefly describe each stakeholder:  
• Employees of a CDFI include the CEO of the organisation, the loan fund 
manager, loan officers and back office support. In smaller organisations of 2 or3 
employees, this separation is obviously diluted, as the CEO may also act as a 
loan officer, while back office duties are allocated equally to the remaining 
employees. 
• Although the Board typically does not appear in existing stakeholder typologies, 
it was distinguished by many respondents. Similar to most non-profit 
organisations, the board comprises unpaid volunteers that generally show a 
strong attachment to the organisation’s mission and feel committed to ‘do good’ 
in their local community. 
• CDFIs often work closely with Cooperating Partners like business support 
agencies, business advisers, or commercial banks that refer clients to them. In 
that sense they occupy a supplier role for the CDFI, as they provide them with 
potential borrowers. 
• Policy Makers set the policy framework for the operations of CDFIs, either 
through the control of critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), or through 
powers attributed by law. Examples of the former group are the Regional 
Development Agencies that since 2006 control the funds flowing into the sector, 
private investors like Charitable Foundations and banks that support certain 
institutions financially. The latter group can be exemplified by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), which regulates all providers of financial services in 
the UK. As most interviewees considered policy making to go hand in hand with 
funding, we included this stakeholder to represent fund allocation. 
• The Funders comprise public sector organisations that act as a source of capital 
for the CDFI.  
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• Unlike Funders, Private Investors have a private sector background. They invest 
in the CDFI either by loans on preferential rates (in the caseof banks) or by 
donations (mostly as part of their CSR activity). Sporadically, indiv dual 
members of the local community may also act as private investors. 
• Clients of the CDFI include individuals as well as micro, small and/or medium 
enterprises that are normally located in the geographic area which is served by 
the institution.5 In the case of business lending, most CDFIs require supporting 
evidence from clients to show their inability to obtain a regular bank loan (e.g., a 
written rejection of a loan application by a bank). 
• CDFIs differ from mainstream financial institutions, as they cultivate specialized 
knowledge about the local communities in which they do business. Local 
communities are included as stakeholders because they serve as driver for the 
creation of the CDFI, which justifies the assumption of an implicit contract 
relationship between CDFI and community (for a critical view on the role of 
‘communities’ in the stakeholder framework cf. Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
 
There are overlaps and inter-relations between different stakeholders. For instance, it 
may be hard to separate the policy makers from the funders, as funding by a 
governmental organisation like a Regional Development Agency is regulaly 
accompanied by regulations and reporting requirements that affect th  in ernal 
processes of the CDFI. Equally, clients are usually part of the local community and 
therefore represent a sub-group of this stakeholder. As such, stakeholders should be 
viewed from a functional perspective; individuals or organisations can o cupy more 
than one stakeholder role. Interestingly, only one of the institutions included in the 
study had developed a stakeholder map similar to the one detailed above, or had made a 
systematic attempt to determine the importance of its stakeholders. N vertheless, all 
interviewees were open to this approach and were willing to apply the stakeholder 
framework to their institutional environment. 
 
In a second step we conducted a content analysis (Holsti, 1969) to identify the main 
themes that dominated the relationships within different groups of stakeholders. Three 
distinct topics emerged, each related to one or more of the stakeholder groups that were 
identified earlier: 
                                                
5 This does not have to be the case. There are some CDFIs that cover their market by target group, e.g.by 
focussing on social enterprises or women.  
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• The organisational structure of the CDFI  
• The type of lending (i.e. loan size and target group of lending) 
• The orientation of the CDFI towards the “client market” or the “funder market” 
 
In the third step, we used Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) for analysing the repertory 
grids that were established (Bell, 1997). This is a widely applied technique for this kind 
of data and is included in most statistical packages (in our case we used the SPSS 
ALSCAL module). MDS enables the mapping of construct variables with the element 
variables and represents these mappings in spatial terms. The distance between the 
stakeholders (elements) and their attributes (constructs) show how closely they are 
related to one another. Therefore, the attributes closest to the stakeholders are those that 
have the most relevance from the point of view of the respondent. 
 
Fransella and Bannister (1977) note that the use of MDS in conjunction with the 
repertory grid approach is relatively uncommon. This may be related to difficulties in 
interpretation. In assessing the extent to which elements and constructs a e associated, 
the distance between co-ordinates is considered. A perfect association would result in an 
exact match of co-ordinate pairs. However, it is the researcher’s discretion how close 
data points have to be in order to be deemed associated. For this reason we decided to 
control our results through both correlation analysis (which allows us to explore 
relationships among the characteristics being studied) and cluster analysis (which 
enables the researcher to explore meaningful groupings that exist within a data set). 
This procedure was also proposed by Fransella and Bannister (1977) in order to 
reappraise one’s conclusions.   
 
In the following section, the empirical findings are reported. Given the constraints of 
space and the complexities of individual cases, we have had to be selective when 
presenting the data. Nevertheless, we consider that the data presented upport the 
arguments posited in a constructive manner. The results of the study are reported in two 
parts. In the first part, we use our stakeholder analysis to develop a way of classifying 
CDFIs along three key dimensions. In doing so we highlight that there is considerable 
variance within the CDFI sector. In the second part, we use this classification to develop 
a preliminary framework for measuring the performance of CDFIs which seeks to 
account for the social and financial aspects of performance. 
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4. A Stakeholder-based Classification of CDFIs 
The content analysis generated three major dimensions which govern a CDFI’s 
relationship with its respective stakeholders, and are therefore key wh n it comes to 
performance measurement. First, it is important to account for its organisational 
structure, i.e. if it is a pure CDFI or if the CDFI is embedd d in an enterprise agency. 
Second, one has to distinguish between different types of CDFI lending, i.e. the loan 
sizes it extends and the target groups it serves. Third, CDFIs differ in their orientation 
towards the market they serve. While some are focused on the client market and see the 
funder market as a means to achieve their aims, others are focused on the funder market, 
and see the client market as a means to achieve their aims. In the following subsections, 
we discuss the three dimensions in detail and relate them to the crresponding group of 
stakeholders. 
 
4.1. Process Stakeholders: Organisational Structure 
The content analysis revealed a clear divide between CDFIs that are solely extending 
loans and CDFIs that are embedded in an enterprise agency. The latter institutions are 
full service agencies that act as one-stop-shops for business development services. Their 
activities comprise a wide array of non-financial services like training, consultancy and 
advisory services, marketing assistance, information, technology development and 
transfer, and business linkage promotion. A distinction is sometimes made between 
‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ business development services. Operational services are 
needed for day-to-day operations, such as information and communications, 
management of accounts and tax records, and compliance with labour laws and other 
regulations. Strategic services, on the other hand, are used by the enterprise to address 
medium- and long-term issues in order to improve the performance of the enterprise, its 
access to markets, and its ability to compete (ILO, 2001). The enterprise agencies we 
interviewed had already been operating for several years or even decades and had 
incorporated loan finance as an additional product into their portfolio. Pure CDFIs, by 
contrast, do not provide any kind of business development services, but rather focus 
solely on extending loans to certain target groups. 
 
GTR is an example of a CDFI that is embedded in an enterprise agency. The 
organisation has been operating for over 20 years, and provides skills development 
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programmes as well as consultancy services for small and micro businesses in the local 
area. The loan fund manager, a retired bank clerk with 30 years of experience in the 
commercial bank world, took a clear stance on the relevance of the CDFI within the 
agency: 
If I’m being honest with you, the scenario is: first and foremost, we’re an 
enterprise agency, and secondly we’re an enterprise agency with a loan fund. 
So, yes, we’re a CDFI and we’re following the remits that are available 
through that. But in a way – in simple terms – we’re an enterprise agency that 
has got a loan fund and we haven’t got that many other whistles and bells and 
things associated with ourselves as a CDFI. 
(Loan fund manager, GTR) 
 
Similarly, the loan fund manager of ADQ, which is also an enterpris agency with a 25-
year-history, illustrated how essential the loan fund was to the agency’s operati ns: 
If we [the loan fund] were to cease straight and tomorrow, ADQ would cope. 
What ADQ actually does is business training and advice (   ), which is quite a 
big section of our company (   ). And (   ) the loan fund is just an added product 
that we can offer. 
(Loan Fund Manager, ADQ) 
 
Pure CDFIs, in contrast, naturally take a very different stance towards the provision of 
additional non-financial services for their clients. GHT is a CDFI that provides loans for 
businesses as well as personal finance. It is a relatively young institution that was set up 
as an initiative of several local and regional bodies. When talking about the 
organisation’s purpose, its CEO highlighted that GHT is not interested in pursuing 
activities that are out with its core mission: 
We’re not interested in delivering business support. We get asked to do all 
sorts of things, because we’re quite good at delivery. But we’re only interested 
in fulfilling our mission and the people who are gonna be interested in that, 
and we bring them in. 
(CEO, GHT) 
 
These different views reflect a noteworthy discrepancy in the way that CDFIs manage 
their relationships with their process stakeholders, particularly their employees and their 
cooperating partners. In some cases, the employees of enterprise agencies are not only 
involved in managing the loan fund, but also execute tasks that are relat d to the 
enterprise agency, such as holding seminars or helping to develop business pla s. They 
tend to see themselves as part of the enterprise agency, and not part f the loan fund. 
Based on the interviews, this can lead to a very different understanding of what 
constitutes the mission of the organisation. While the employees of pure CDFIs in many 
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cases show strong commitment to providing loans to specific target groups, the mission 
of employees from enterprise agencies tends to focus on the support of small 
businesses. Loan finance is seen by them as only one alternative within a wider product 
range.  
 
Furthermore, enterprise agencies have the possibility to cross-sub idise their CDFIs via 
income streams that are generated through business development services. This allows 
them greater freedom in choosing their target market as well as the social or financial 
aims they want to achieve, as external funding can at least partly be substituted 
internally. Consequently, one might assume that the relevance of funders is considered 
lower in enterprise agencies compared to pure CDFIs, which are fully dependent on 
external sources of finance.  
 
Another difference lies in the way cooperating partners are perceiv d. While enterprise 
agencies have the opportunity to ‘hatch’ their future borrowers, pure CDFIs need to rely 
on a well-functioning network of cooperating partners that have the capability of 
supplying them with investment-ready clients. Pure CDFIs therefore have to take an 
active stance in managing their relationships with cooperating partners in order to hold 
up a constant deal flow over time. This does not mean that enterprise agencies can do 
without their cooperating partners (in fact, they play a vital role f r all of the enterprise 
agencies that we interviewed); nevertheless in situations where the supply of 
investment-ready clients deteriorates, it can at least partly be substituted internally.  
 
4.2. Environmental Stakeholders 
4.2.1. Clients: Type of Lending 
When the interviewees were asked to describe the relationships they had with their 
clients, it became clear that there are two main issues governing these relationships. 
First, three loan types need to be treated separately: personal loans, microloans, and 
SME loans. Second, the target group that is served by the CDFI plays a vital role for the 
nature of the relationship with clients. 
 
With regard to the loan types, personal loans are usually not higher than 1,000 pounds 
and are intended for various purposes like household expenses, ‘back to work’ 
expenditures, or personal debt consolidation. In the case of business loans, there is a 
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broad taxonomic consent within the CDFI sector that microloans are those up to a 
maximum of 10,000 pounds, while SME loans cover funding needs that lie between 
10,000 and 50,000 pounds. The main difference between these loan types, though, does 
not lie in the amount that is lent, but in the nature of the relationship with the borrower. 
One CEO reported that his CDFI had been moving away from microloans and focusing 
instead upon SME loans. His justification for this strategy was as follows: 
Micro enterprise lending is really up to [a loan amount of] about 10,000 
[pounds]. (  ) It’s more about people who think: I would like to work for 
myself. They’re not really thinking about building a business; they think about 
how can I create through trading opportunities an income for myself? And 
they’re one person bands in the main. And they’re very high risk, and they 
generally need an enormous amount of business support to go alongside the 
lending, which is why we’ve chosen to come out of it. 
(CEO, SWQ) 
 
A similar argument was also made by the CEO of SFP, a pure CDFI that has been 
operating for around 10 years. He reasoned the move from the microloan t the SME 
loan segment by referring to the different costs involved: 
We’ve moved away from the 1,000 to 10,000 [pound segment], because we 
can’t make that pay on our model, it’s too costly. We made loans from 10,000-




Thus a crucial decision for a given CDFI is the target market that it chooses to focus on, 
as this has important implications for the nature of the relationships with its clients as 
well as the costs involved in the lending process. As is shown in Table 2, there are two 
dimensions through which the different target markets can be described: the complexity 
of the credit assessment process, and the nature of the business support. In the case of 
personal loans, the credit assessment process tends to be quite quick, and is usually 
based on very simple formal criteria such as the applicant’s age, postcode area, or 
income. By contrast, decisions about microloans and SME loans are based on the 
evaluation of business plans that describe the purpose of a given business and the 
intended use of the loan, which makes the whole process more complex and time-
consuming.  
 
While personal loans are not connected to any additional support after hey have been 
approved, CDFIs are expected to provide business support to the recipients of 
microloans and SME loans for the duration of the repayment period, either themselves 
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or through cooperating partners. More generally, microloan clients require more 
intensive support than SME loan clients. This is mainly due to the fact th t the 
businesses of microloan clients tend to be start-ups and typically have less experience 
than SME loan businesses. As explained earlier, business support is not an issue for 
pure CDFIs; their main purpose is to identify adequate cooperating partners in order to 
make their clients investment-ready. 
 
 
Table 2: Nature of Credit Assessment and Business Support according to loan size. 
 
 Credit Assessment Business Support 
Personal loans Simple n/a 
Microloans Complex high 
SME loans Complex moderate 
 
Another issue that dominates CDFIs’ relationships with clients is the different target 
groups that they serve. The institutions in the study differ in their focus on specific 
client groups, the unifying theme being to help overcome financial exclusion. While all 
have clear geographic restrictions in their lending activities (mostly as a result of the 
conditions placed on CDFIs by donors), some also confine their borrowing to specific 
target groups like women, ethnic minorities and disabled people. Others pose certain 
exigencies towards the types of businesses that can be lent, e.g., by stipulating that the 
businesses which receive funds must make an identifiable local impact, or have a 
specific ethical cause. This influences the way in which clients are dealt with, as each 
target group has specific needs that need to be met. TDF’s loan fund manager, for 
example, emphasised the varying risk perceptions of men and women when taking up 
loans: 
There is a very great difference in dealing with women. Because I would say 
90% of the time the advisor team has to convince a woman to apply for more 
than they were initially going to do. Whereas the opposite is true for men, who 
always want the maximum [loan amount] available. 
(Loan Fund Manager, TDF) 
4.2.2. Clients and Funders: Market Focus 
The analysis of the repertory grid data through multidimensional scaling (MDS) enabled 
us to map stakeholders and the constructs that were named by the interviewees in spatial 
terms based on two dimensions. We found one dimension to be constant throughout 
most of the repertory grids, namely the divide between the environmental stakeholders 
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according to their role as fund absorbing or fund allocating entity (cf. also Figure 2). We 
labelled the former “client market”, and the latter “funder market”. One interviewee 
commented that serving these two markets simultaneously would pose a fundamental 
challenge for any grant-funded organisation. On the one hand, the organisation’s 
mission is aimed at lending to a specific client group; on the other hand, public funds 
are often tied to conditions that restrict their usage. Thus a central question for CDFIs 
is: which of these markets constitutes its core mission and what is the mechanism for 
achieving this mission? One loan fund manager summarized this dilemma in the 
following way: 
Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks with any grant-supported organisation is 
that in an ideal world is that what would happen is that we would perceive a 
need and decide how we wanted to address that need, and then approach the 
funders asking them to fund us. The reality is that we get to hear that there is a 
new funder or there is funds available and the criteria that the funders set we 
can adapt or we can use to support our key aims. 
(CEO, EAS) 
 
As described above, we included three constructs into the repertory grids that captured 
the three dimensions which constitute a stakeholder’s salience – power, legitimacy, and 
urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997). With the help of the MDS procedure, we wer  able to 
graphically relate these constructs to particular stakeholder groups, and thereby 
understand the prioritisation of stakeholders by each individual CDFI. In assessing the 
extent to which elements and constructs are associated, the distance between 
coordinates is considered. A perfect association would result in an exact match of 
coordinate pairs. This analysis revealed two types of CDFIs, which differed primarily in 
the way they perceived the two market sides they prioritise. While one group of CDFIs 
had a clear focus on the client market, the other group either had a clear focus on the 
funder market or did not exhibit any clear focus at all, i.e. they w re “lost” between the 
two markets. 
 
GHT is a typical example of a CDFI that is clearly focused on the client market, which 
is nicely illustrated by the MDS evaluation of its repertory g id (see Figures 1 and 4 in 
the Appendix). Dimension 2 clearly represents the client market/funder market divide, 
while Dimension 1 depicts the nature of the aims that the individual stakeholders pursue 
(i.e., social vs. financial aims). In this specific case, the local community is seen as part 
of the funder market, because it was understood by the interviewee as th  collectivity of 
any organisations or individuals from the local area that are financially involved in the 
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CDFI, but not the recipients of loans. All three salience constructs are closest to the 
clients, indicating a clear focus on this market, which is also evidenced by the following 
quotation from its CEO: 
And because of our background – the way that we operate is like a private-
sector organisation, we’re driven in a private-sector manner – so we are 
uniquely harsh with our donors. I will say to them things like: I will not take 
this grant unless you do x, y, z. 
(CEO, GHT) 
 
HED’s repertory grid evaluation (see Figure 5), by contrast, reveals a different 
perception of funder and client market. Dimension 1 represents the two different market 
sides, while Dimension 2 could be interpreted as the abstractness of the individual 
stakeholders, ranging from very abstract (local community) to very tangible (voluntary 
directors). In the case of Figure 4, the salience constructs are all centred around the 
funder group, indicating the priority of that market for the CDFI. Its loan fund manager, 
a former bank clerk with 25 years of commercial bank experience, confirms this 
interpretation when describing the motivation for addressing specific clientgroups: 
I think [we] have effectively been driven by what money was available and for 
what purpose by the government. And because that pot of money was available 
then it happens. And therefore policies were made and driven, totally because 
the money could be achieved; if you meet these criteria and if you act like this 
those policies are adopted and therefore that slant has been put on it. 
(Loan Fund Manager, HED) 
 
Returning to the question of client and funder market focus, we conclude that one group 
of CDFIs sees its mission in serving a specific client market. Addressing the funder 
market is the purpose to achieve this mission. The remaining groups, in turn, see their 
mission in accessing available funds from the funder market; addressing the client 
market is therefore the purpose in order to obtain these funds.  
 
5. Towards a Performance Measurement Framework for CDFIs 
According to Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997), the notion of primary and secondary 
performance measures is central in the development any performance measurement 
framework. In the case of CDFIs, primary performance measures are related to the 
double bottom line; i.e., its financial and social returns. Typical exmples for financial 
returns are measures like its operational self-sufficiency (i.e. how well costs can be 
covered through operating revenues), or its portfolio yield (i.e. the gross loan portfolio’s 
ability to generate financial revenue from interest, fees and commissions). Social returns 
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refer, for instance, to the number of jobs created or sustained through lending activities, 
or the target group focus, measured by the number of clients that belong to a specific 
target group in relation to the total number of clients (for a theoretical framework on 
social returns cf. Navajas et al., 2000). 
 
What the organisation expects or gives to each stakeholder group to achieve its primary 
objectives are its secondary objectives (Atkinson and Waterhouse, 1997). The basis for 
identifying these secondary objectives lies in the way that stakeholder relationships are 
managed by the CDFI. Success is created by monitoring and managing performance on 
the secondary objectives, which should therefore be the focus of the organisation’s 
performance measurement. As Atkinson and Waterhouse (1997) note, ‘improving 
organisational performance by monitoring financial performance [i.e. a primary 
performance measure] is as useless as trying to improve a sports team’s performance by 
only reporting the scores of its games.’ The focus of attention needs to be on the 
secondary objectives. As noted above, there are three main dimensions wh ch describe 
the ways in which a CDFI interacts with its stakeholders: (i) its organisational structure 
(related to process stakeholders); (ii) loan type and target group; and (iii) client vs. 
funder market focus (both related to environmental stakeholders). These ar  the 
underlying dimensions of the secondary objectives, or the drivers of performance. 
Figure 3 illustrates this relationship between drivers and measures of performance. 
 
 
Figure 3: A Framework for Performance Measurement of CDFIs. 
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At the outset of the analysis (see Figure 2) we defined three distinct groups of 
stakeholders, namely process stakeholders (employees, board, and cooperating 
partners), as well as environmental stakeholders. The latter group was divided into 
source of funds (funders, private investors, and policy makers), and use of funds 
(clients, and local community). The three drivers of stakeholder management that we 
have identified cover each of these groups. In accordance with Freeman (1984) we posit 
that systematic managerial attention to stakeholder interests is critical to the success of a 
firm. Neglecting the needs and demands of one of these groups will lead to a significant 
loss of legitimacy, and – in the longer term – failure of the CDFI. Process stakeholders 
and environmental stakeholders (the latter ones in their roles as fund allocation and fund 
absorption) act as the three main pillars that support any CDFI’s activity. The implicit 
and explicit contractual relationships with these entities have to be managed 
simultaneously in order to ensure a balance within the stakeholder system. Therefore, 
we state in our first proposition:  
 
P1: A CDFI has to manage its relationships with all three stakeholder groups 
concurrently to excel in social and financial terms. Losing the support from one of these 
groups is likely to result in the failure of an institution over the medium term. 
 
The drivers of performance that we have identified will probably relate to the financial 
or social nature of a CDFI’s performance. With regard to organisational structure, our 
results indicate that CDFIs embedded in an enterprise agency tend to be the 
beneficiaries of cross-subsidising within the agency. This may le d to a softer stance 
regarding financial viability compared to pure CDFIs that depend solely on their 
lending activities. Our data support this conjecture, assuming that the interest rates that 
are charged serve as an indicator: Within our sample, the three organisations that charge 
the highest interest rates were pure CDFIs. Furthermore, our analysis has shown that 
CDFI employees of enterprise agencies tend to see their work in a more holistic way 
compared to their counterparts from pure CDFIs. Enterprise finance is regarded as one 
element within a wider range of products, which might also contribute to a softer stance 
towards sustainability. This leads us to our second proposition: 
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P2: CDFIs that are embedded in an enterprise agency will exhibit higher lev ls of 
social performance than pure CDFIs. Pure CDFIs, in turn, will exhibit higher 
indicators of financial performance. 
 
The picture becomes more complicated when it comes to the loan size and the target 
market that is served, respectively. Specific target markets are connected to 
corresponding measures of social performance. A CDFI that is t rgeting its activities at 
supporting women’s entrepreneurship should be measured along different social
performance indicators than a CDFI that supports entrepreneurship within the 
cooperative movement. Equally, borrowers in rural areas might face completely 
different obstacles compared to their counterparts who live in urban centres. Social 
outputs are therefore highly target-group specific, which makes benchmarking across 
different institutions extremely difficult.  
 
With regard to the loan size, though, a general assumption towards financial 
performance can be made which is purely based on cost considerations.6 As has been 
described above, the credit assessment process in the case of microloans and SME loans 
is comparably complex, as it is based on a business plan which then, as a rule, is 
evaluated by a loan panel. Consequently, the relationship between fixed costs and total 
loan size will be less favourable in the case of microloans. Furthermor , businesses 
receiving microloans tend to have no track record as they are usually tart-ups, whereas 
businesses receiving SME loans tend to have some business experience. It is thus easier 
for a CDFI to assess the risk profile of the latter group compared to the former group. 
Based on these considerations, we derive our third proposition: 
 
P3: A CDFI’s financial performance will be higher if it operates in the SME loan 
segment compared to operating in the microloan segment. 
 
Consequently, financial performance indicators should take loan sizes into account. It 
does not seem appropriate to compare financial indicators of an institut on hat extends 
microloans with an average of 5,000 pounds to an SME lender whose average loan is 
                                                
6 It is acknowledged that most probably there will be a correlation between target group and loan size,
which might make it difficult to treat these two dimensions completely independently from each other. 
Furthermore, we do not take into account personal lending because of its differing methodology, which 
has been detailed above. 
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20,000 pounds. If a CDFI covers loans of different sizes, it is advisable to split the loan 
portfolio according to loan size, and assess their financial performance separately. 
 
We believe that the most important driver of performance is also the one that is t e most 
difficult to measure, namely the market orientation of the CDFI. Non-profit 
organisations, like their counterparts from the private sector, need to understand the 
market they are serving and not only react to the remits that are v ilable through public 
funding. It is only when the clients become the focus of institutional attention that their 
needs are liable to be understood. This will allow for a long-term strategy that involves 
serving a specific market as opposed to a ‘patchwork’ strategy that focuses mainly on 
the public funds that are available at a particular point in time. Clearly, this does not 
allow for the ‘systematic attention’ to stakeholder interests that Freeman (1984) 
regarded as essential for organisational success. This leads us to our final proposition: 
 
P4: CDFIs that focus on the client market will exhibit higher financil and social 
performance indicators compared to CDFIs that are focused on the funder market. 
 
Using the repertory grid technique, we have proposed a strategy designed to assess 
whether a CDFI is focused on the client market or the funder market. Although the 
process of acquiring these data was rather cumbersome, by providing a framework to 
help identify (1) CDFIs that are liable to survive in the long term, and (2) CDFIs that 
are liable to achieve the greatest social impact, we believe our study makes a 
substantive contribution and has the potential to help policy makers maximise the 
efficient use of limited public funds. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Applying a stakeholder approach towards performance measurement for CDFIs in the 
UK has allowed us to develop some important insights into the relationship between the 
factors that underpin performance and the concept of the double bottom line; i.e., the 
aim of achieving financial and social returns. Based on their stakeholder environments, 
we identified different ways of classifying CDFI performance according to three 
dimensions: organisational structure, the type of lending they pursue, and their focus on 
the client or the funder market. In advancing our argument we have pres nted four 
propositions. To excel in social and financial terms, a given CDFI has to manage its 
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relationships with all three stakeholder groups (i.e. process stakeholders, use of funds, 
and source of funds) concurrently. Second, CDFIs that are embedded in an enterprise 
agency will exhibit higher indicators of social performance than pure CDFIs. Third, a 
CDFI’s financial performance will be higher if it operates in the SME loan segment as 
compared to operating in the microloan segment. Finally, CDFIs that focus on the client 
market will exhibit higher financial and social performance indicators compared to 
CDFIs that focus on the funder market. 
 
6.1. Implications  
Our study has a number of implications for actors involved in the CDFI movement. 
Most importantly, practitioners from the CDFI sector often complain bout the 
multitude of demands that they face from different actors. The framework that we have 
proposed could be used by individual CDFIs to map the organisation’s stakeholders an  
prioritise their claims. Furthermore, the framework might help to reframe discussions 
about the double bottom line of CDFIs. The question of which objectives – social or 
financial – CDFIs should prioritise, and whether both sets of objectives can be reached 
simultaneously, has been the source of much discussion and debate. Our analysis 
suggests shifting the focus away from a fixed set of measures, and instead adopting a 
contingency approach in which different measures are used to assess diff rent types of 
CDFI. When there is clarity about the factors that underpin the performance of a 
particular CDFI, one can then begin to discus the measures. Our propositions – which 
are certainly open to critical discussion – might serve to guide this process. 
 
Policy makers are interested in identifying CDFIs that use public funds in the most 
efficient way. As stated in the introduction, recent funding policies in the UK gave the 
impression that the sector was seen as a rather homogeneous block by policy makers. 
Peer groups of CDFIs could be created using the three dimensions identified in this 
article to enable more appropriate comparison. After identifying CDFIs that perform 
within each peer group, their lending activities should not be restrict d to exhaustive 
rules and regulations (one loan fund manager reported that his funder gave him a 
detailed list defining the characteristics of financially excluded persons). Rather, they 
should be supported with sufficient capital to achieve scale (Ratcliffe and Moy, 2004) 
and be given the opportunity to operate for some years with a minimum of restrictions 
on their lending activities.  
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From an academic point of view, we believe that this paper makes a theoretical as well 
as a methodological contribution. First, the approach towards performance measureent 
presented could be valuable for the analysis of any non-profit organisatio  or social 
enterprise. It highlights ‘who or what really matters’ to the CDFIs – whether the focus is 
on the funder market or the client market. From a methodological perspective, the 
repertory grid technique delivered new insights into the motivations of non-profit 
entrepreneurs. We believe that our methodological approach has wide applicability 
within the third sector as many non-profit organisations face the fundamental challenge 
of serving two markets – i.e., clients and funders.  
 
6.2. Directions for Future Research 
There are two main limitations to our analysis. First, we did not take into account 
possible interactions between stakeholders (Neville and Menguc, 2006). The majority of 
stakeholders that we have defined are in fact interconnected and do not act in isolation. 
One example is Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR), which as been designed by 
policy makers to attract private investment to the community development finance 
sector. These stakeholder interactions add a new layer of complexity to our analysis and 
suggest many avenues for future research. 
 
A second limitation is the fact that there might be problems of interaction between the 
factors that underpin performance that we have identified. A certain characteristic of 
one driver might predispose the characteristic of the other drivers, and therefore weaken 
our propositions, which assumed that each driver is independent. Within our sample, we 
did not find any statistically significant correlations7, which might also be due to the 
rather small sample size. Further research will be required to gain more insights into 
possible interdependencies betwen drivers. 
 
Finally, our analysis has focused on the CDFI market in the UK. It would be interesting 
to see if the framework that we have established can be replicat d for comparable 
institutions in other European countries. Additionally, it might be possible to test our 
propositions empirically through the collection of quantitative data. This would 
                                                
7 Based on a Chi2-Test of independence. 
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represent an important step in developing our preliminary findings into a genuine 
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Table 1: Summary of the Cases. 
Name Year founded 
Gross loan 








GHT 2003 600,000 b/p no 
JAI 2001 650,000 b/p no 
HED 2003 186,000 b yes 
GTR 2002 1,372,000 b yes 
SWQ 2002 1,000,000 b no 
MBD 2000 360,000 p no 
WSD 2005 390,000 b no 
GVC* 1983 n/a b yes 
ODE 1998 700,000 b no 
ISD 1992 270,000 b no 
ADQ 2004 740,000 b yes 
DFR 1997 1,500 b/p yes 
LPO 2004 20,000 b yes 
RWE 2005 130,000 b/p no 
EAS 2005 580,000 b/p no 
SFP 1997 2,200,000 b no 
ASL* 2005 n/a b/p yes 
BCV 1986 460,000 b yes 
TDF 1987 1,166,000 b yes 
HBY 2004 643,000 b/p no 
 






























Figure 5: MDS plot of HED. 
 
